Mendez vs. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 201614, January 12, 2016
Topic: Jurisdiction of the Shariah Courts
FACTS
- Petitioner: Sheryl M. Mendez
- Respondents: Shari’a District Court, 5th Shari’a District, Cotabato City; Rasad G. Balindong (Acting Presiding Judge); 1st Shari’a Circuit Court, 5th Shari’a District, Cotabato City; Montano K. Kalimpo (Presiding Judge); and Dr. John O. Maliga
Background
Sheryl M. Mendez and Dr. John O. Maliga were married under Muslim rites on April 9, 2008. They had a daughter, Princess Fatima M. Maliga, born before their marriage. The marriage soured shortly after the wedding. Maliga filed a petition for the judicial confirmation of talaq (divorce) on November 2, 2010, which the Sharia Circuit Court (ShCC) in Cotabato City, seeking custody of their minor child. Maliga alleged that Mendez, who was originally a Roman Catholic, reverted to Christianity after their marriage and enrolled their daughter in a Catholic school without his consent. He claimed that Mendez’s actions were detrimental to their daughter’s Islamic upbringing.
Lower Court Decisions:
Shariah Circuit Court
On November 12, 2010, the ShCC granted Maliga’s urgent motion for temporary custody of Princess Fatima, citing Maliga’s social, financial, and religious standing as reasons for the decision
On December 3, 2010, the ShCC partially considered its order, granting Mendez visitation rights but maintaining custody with Maliga.
On August 19, 2011, the ShCC confirmed the talaq (divorce) between Mendez and Maliga, awarded custody of Princess Fatima to Maliga and ordered Maliga to give Mendez a mut’a (consolatory gift) of P24,000.00
Shariah District Court
Mendez appealed the ShCC’s custody ruling to ShDC, arguing that the ShCC lacked jurisdiction over the custody matters and that the orders were issued without proper notice or hearing.
On March 30, 2012, the ShDC affirmed ShCC’s decision, ruling that Mendez, having reverted to Christianity, was disqualified from custody under Shariah Law until she returned to Islam.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
Mendez argued that the ShCC acted without jurisdiction in awarding custody, as custody matters fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the ShDC under Article 143(1)(a) of PD 1083. She contended that the ShCC’s orders were issued in violation of due process, as Maliga’s urgent motion for temporary custody lacked the required notice of hearing, and she was not given an opportunity to be heard. Mendez also argued that she should have been awarded custody under Article 78 of PD 1083, which provides that custody of children below seven years old should belong to the mother.
Respondent’ s Contentions:
Maliga argued that Mendez’s reversion to Christianity disqualified her from custody under Shariah Law, and that he was better suited to provide for their daughter’s religious and financial needs. He claimed that Mendez was financially dependent on him and that their daughter’s academic performance improved under his care.
ISSUES
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- Whether or not the ShCC erred in acting on Maliga’s urgent motion for issuance of temporary custody;
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- Whether or not the ShCC and the ShDC had jurisdiction to rule on the issue of custody; and
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- Whether or not custody was properly granted to Maliga.
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RULING
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. The Court declared the following orders NULL and VOID:
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- The November 12, 2010, and December 3, 2010, orders of ShCC regarding custody and visitation.
- The August 19, 2011 order of the ShCC regarding custody.
- The March 30, 2012 decision of the ShDC regarding custody.
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Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of a case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. The Congress has the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts, and courts are without authority to act where jurisdiction has not been conferred by law. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court, and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal.
The law which confers jurisdiction on the Shari’a courts is P.D. No. 1083.
Art. 143. Original jurisdiction. —
(1) The Shari’a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under this Code;
(b)All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation or correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two of this Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of name and commitment of an insane person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.
x x x xArt. 155. Jurisdiction. — The Shari’a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under this Code.
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
(d) Customary dower (mahr);
(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;
(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts, (mut’a); and
(g) Restitution of marital rights.
(3) All cases involving disputes relative to communal properties.
[Emphases and Underscoring Supplied]
It is clear that the ShCC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions between parties who have been married in accordance with the Muslim law, involving disputes relating to divorce under P.D. No. 1083. There is, therefore, no doubt that the ShCC had jurisdiction to confirm the talaq between Mendez and Maliga.
Article 143 above, however, clearly provides that the ShDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving custody under P.D. No. 1083. Exclusive jurisdiction is the power of the court to take cognizance of and decide certain cases to the exclusion of any other courts. Original jurisdiction is the power of the court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law.
On the other hand, appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a court higher in rank to re examine the final order of judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review. Since the two jurisdictions are exclusive of each other, each must be expressly conferred by law. One does not flow from, nor is inferred from the other.
To rule that the ShCC is without jurisdiction to resolve issues on custody after it had decided on the issue of divorce, simply because it appears to contravene Article 143 of P.D. No. 1083, would be antithetical to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. “While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.”
At this juncture, the question must be asked: By recognizing the power of the ShCC to rule on the issue of custody, would this effectively render Article 143 of P.D. No. 1083 meaningless, considering that the same is unequivocal in providing that the ShDC has the exclusive original jurisdiction to decide on all cases involving custody?
A distinction must be made between a case for divorce wherein the issue of custody is an ancillary issue and a case where custody is the main issue. Jurisdiction in the former, as discussed above, lies with the ShCC, as the main cause of action is divorce. The latter on the other hand, where the main cause of action is one of custody, the same must be filed with the ShDC, pursuant to Article 143 of P.D. No. 1083.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the award of custody to Maliga by the ShCC was void as it was rendered in violation of the constitutional right of Mendez to due process. A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court. It is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules, and, hence, even the clerk has no right to receive it.
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