People v. Adriano GR No L-477
Topic: Treason; 2-witness rule
Facts:
- Apolinario Adriano, Filipino Citizen, is a member of Makapilia military organization established and designed to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy’s war efforts and operations against the United States and the Philippines,
- The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of defendant’s having joined the Makapili organization.
- People’s court found that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of personal property, but had not been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy.
Issue:
- Whether or not the two-witness requirement was fulfilled – No
- Whether or not membership Makapili constitute adherence to the enemy or an overt act that needs two-wtinesses – It is an overt act, so it must be established by two witnesses.
Ruling:
- No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.
- We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were “to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;” “to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;” “to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;” and “to fight the common enemies.” Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed himself at the enemy’s call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference from that of enlisting in the invader’s army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth?
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court. To the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule “severely restrictive.” This provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit’s guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act.
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